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HARD TIMES - ACCOUNTABILITY IN ENGLAND
Accountability is already. such a familiar theme in educational
debate that its basic issue structure is known to all of us. For
what? by whom? to whom? and in what form? are the main bones of
contention. The need for accountability, or rather for more ol',"
different accountability, is not disputed, although it is variously
construed by different individuals and organisations. This con-
sensus is a late development, consequent upon recognition of the
elasticity of the concept and the emergence of 'softer' inter-
pretations than seemed likely when it surfaced in public discussion
in the early seventies. It app"'.!it::ed fi:r,,1; as. a .hard-nosed threat
fromd:i,,,:,,"1:.:i,,,;fi,,,qp,,xm,,sters, replete with intonations of coiled
accusation and the promise of summary justice for an allegedly
siackandi.ncompete~tt~achingproJ:",,,sioll. In this guise account-
, ,' ,.". " .. " .. -,-, .' '.,., ,.,.. ,
ability generated ripples· of alarm among those immediately in the
firing line and roused the twin spectres of 1862 and :\.984. Without
wishing to suggest that the concept has entirely shed this image of
harsh managerial evaluation, I think it fair to say that in the inter-
vening period the issue has become more complex, more susceptible to
competing ideological presuppositions, and more embracing in its
ramifications.
As a rhetorical device, accountability has proved to be an invaluable
aide de camp for every educational crusade, ranging ideologically from
the CCE Campaign for Comprehensive Education, calling for a new
Education Act to force the recalcitrant Tamesides and Kingstons into
line, to the Black Paper thunderers demanding an end to the allegedly
soft-centred pedagogy of an allegedly maverick teaching profession.
Most importantly the issue of accountability in education is now seen
to be an off-shoot of a larger societal debate about the contemporary
malaise of liberal democracy, a debate which constitutes one of the
contexts for this particular review. The autonomy of the education
service in this country has always been more questionable than those
within it have cared to admit, but its peculiarly obfuscated power
structure has generally been considered to provide adequate insurance
2against bids for dominance from any single quarter. Current
challenges, under the banner of accountability, to the way our
educational institutions function as socia~ agencies invite us
to re-examine these relationships and consider whether a new
insurance policy is called for. The task of understanding account-
ability in education thus calls for a broad approach and the inte~
gration of a set of perspectives which will frequently look beyond
the boundaries of the educational sector in a search for enlighten-
ment.
Uses·of Accountability
From time to time one reads i bemusedly, of the zealous or hyper-
active worker whose productivity so embarrasses his fellow employees
that he is called to account for over-achievement and, in the event
of his failing either to absolve himself from personal responsibility
or to promise to do worse in future, is instructed to seek a form of
employment less suited to his talents. Such cases are still rare
enough to attract press publicity, usually followed by general censure
of the work force concerned, calls for anything up to a knighthood
for the victim, and much shaking of heads about the sad state of
industrial relations. This may seem far removed from the proper
concerns of a review of educational accountability, but it does serve
to remind us of something we might otherwise overlook; accountability
may be invoked to restrain as well as to improve performance, to limit as much
as to define liability. Nor are such cases confined to the factory
floor, although in the social services indices of productivity are
usually too inconclusive to support prosecution. I certainly know of
one university department where an enthusiastic tutor was dissuaded
by collective protest from coaching his less able undergraduates on
the grounds that they were thereby afforded an unfair advantage over
those whose tutors adhered strictly to the timetable, One future
for the current accountability movement, if pressed to substantial
realisation, would feature as much concern about upper limits to
performance as is now expressed about lower limits. If accountability
has its casualities, we may have to include the excessively virtuous
among them.
3But I press on too quickly. In a society noted, as ours is, for
its inertia the suggestion that a 'movement' is taking place should
be treated with some sceptism, even at the risk of being surprised
by events. No-one would deny that we have all the rhetoric of an
accow>tability movement in education and a formidable parade of.
advocates warming up on the touchlines. Nor would they deny that,
despite the indiscriminate adoption of the concept by reformists of
differing persuasions, accountability has an orthodox meaning which
is either assumed or explicitly challenged wherever the topic is
discussed. A new language, hastily borrowed from fields where ends/
means reasoning seems to be relatively non-problematic, appears
conceptually capable of transforming education from an indeterminate
process in professional hands to a delivery system w>der public
control, has emerged this decade and captured the concerns, if not
the imagination, of legislator, bureaucrat and educational practit-
ioner alike. Not all of trem of course; orthodox accountability has
attracted revisionists as well as champions, and its proposed forms
and targets are now so various that one must stipulate which parti-
cular form and target one has in mind before speculating about whose
interests might be enhanced or whose intelligence insulted.by it,
For instance, some of the more active opponents of the early manager-
ial prototype (Michael Eraut in Sussex and John Elliott in Cambridge-
shire, for instance) have recently countered with models of institut-
ional accountability based on openness of process as an alternative
to specification of product. In so doing they have in a sense stolen
the enemy's clothes, and thus made this reviewer's task more diffi.cult.
At the same time such initiatives, though still at the research stage,
do suggest that something of interest is happening. Combined ·with a
number of other initiatives, innovations and developments, which I
shall shortly come to, they constitute the prima facie case for the
existence of cnaccountability movement. Whether or not the Inovement'
can generate sufficient propulsion to effect a significant change in
the oonduct of education, and whether or not we can detect with any
confidence the directicn of such a change, I shall consider l"ter.
Few issues in education have been so overtly politicised as account-
ability, and I doubt if the issue can be understood without rather
detailed reference to the broader social and historical context in
4which the issue has been raised. And, in so far as educational
accountability represents a response to economic and political
problems that encompass but transcend educational concerns, its
future is likely to be shaped, if not determined, by the ways in
which these problems are resolved within that larger framework.
In particular, the historical correlation between educational
change and economic change is too well attested to be ignored,
even if the nature of the interactive process remains a matter of
ideological dispute.
Accountability - the societal context
For the British people the winter of 78/79 is truly one of discontent;
the sense of liying in a failing society has become pervasive. Inflation
persists, dole queues stretch into the bleak future, especially for
young people, and welfare services decline. To the cynical observer
bureaucracy and tax avoidance stand alone as growth industries,
feeding alienation. Appeals to the national interest fallon increas-
ingly deaf ears as the failure of successive resorts to macro-economic
management demonstrates more and more clearly just why Britain is in
the hapless tax haven of international business and the poor, relation
of the European Economic Community.
To the economic impotence of British government many would now add
moral drift on a scale which dwarfs the fading indiscretions of Profumo
in the previous, more bouyant decade. Poulson revealed the rot in
local government as well as the structure of temptation in the'manage-
ment of the public purse. Subsequent casep reinforced the profound
unease that was generated by the Poulson case about the integrity of
the public services. More recent events now threaten to convert that
unease into comprehensive disaffection with the body politic. Recently
the press of the world gathered at Minehead to record the grubby
wheeler-dealings of previously respected political figures, while at
the same time another court indicted another set of powerful govern-
ment leaders for abusing the criminal justice system in the prosecution
of two investigative journalists. And overshadowing these devaluations
of the moral currency was Bingham's exposure of a decade of conspiratorial
5deceit at the highest levels of political, administrative and
business responsibility in the matter of Rhodesian sanction. The
sight of the two major political parties, both implicated in the
Bingham Report, closing ranks as the demands for a full-scale
enquiry rose, conferred both a new meaning to the parliamentary
tradition of consensus politics and a bitter twist to the Prime
Minister's recent decision to jettison his Party's manifesto
commitment to open government. And no-one resigns. Perhaps,
as the Oxford Union's ecstatic reception of citizen Nixon suggests,
there is no longer any reason why they should. Such is the stuff
of political atheism.
Against such a background of inepitude and abuse it would be sur-
prising if we did not hear, among the welter of proposed remedies,
calls for more effective accountability procedures. The targets
of such advocacies have been many and various. By a pointed irony
only the monarchy has so far escaped the pathologist's microscope
as the liberal-democratic state is subjected to a searching review.
The scene is a confusing one, not least because the justificatory
rhetoric of accountability has been harnessed to competing agendas.
But at the broadest political level the demand for accountability
is a response to a society believed to be both in decline and out
of legitimate control. And at the heart of this concern is an
argument about the role of the bureaucracy.
Bureaucracy and bureauphobia
At a fundamental level it is argued that the state has outgrown its
accountability mechanisms, which no longer assure democratic control.
In theory,of course, liberal democracy is the most accountable of
systems of government. Citizens elect representatives to act as their
agents in the conduct of government, and require them periodically
to give an account of their performances and to submit themselves
to re-election or eviction. These governors make law and policy,
and levy taxes; they also employ people to administer and imple-
ment government. These employees in turn are accountable to the
governors, who take formal responsibility for directing and supervising
6their work, whilst in practice delegating much of the day-to··day
responsibility through hierarchical and specialised staffing
arrangements. Thus all civic power is provisional, authorised,
referrable and accountable to the people. Neat theory, possibly
foolproof in small tribes, arguably feasible in larger but relatively
simply social organisations, but increasingly problematic in the
kind of large-scale, heavily populated, urbanised and economically
unstable agglomerates in which most of us now live! In Britain,
where the contemporary infrastructure of democracy has evolved
adaptively over a long.periodof time, the susceptibility of the
machinery of government to popular control through representative
government has become a matter of frequent, and latterly heated,
debate. Since the second world war particularly, the expansion of
government functions combined with the accelerating rate of legis-
lative enactment have combined to generate a growth and proliferation
of bureaucractic mechanisms to the point where their very size
and complexity would seem to exclude the possibility of close control.
In the last ten years two major reviews of the central bureaucracy,
the Fulton Report of 1968 and the Select Committee Report of 1978,
have explored this concern, and the lengthy public debate which
attended the deliberations of the parliamentary committee last year
Was a fair reflection of the rising tide of anxiety and even alarm
about the power of the civil service.
But the problem of bureaucratic accountability, as it is posed in our
society at this time is formidably complex; it is not simply a problem
of bigness or of the power syndromes generated by growth and.opport-
uni ty, although both need to be kept in mind. The rise of entre-
preneurial government intent upon economic management of a more
direct kind than we have known in previous eras of less competitive
international trading and the corresponding increase in the use of
legislative power to orchestrate the national effort, have entailed
not just a need for more bureaucracy, or even more interventive
bureaucracy, but also for a faster bureaucracy with a more respon-
sive capability.
One way to cope would be. to create a.much larger number of government
7departments, restricting each to a manageable size under ministerial
surveillance; an alternative, clearly enjoying the support of
western democracies, is to maintain the number of departments but
to absorb additional functions, particularly those of a special-
ised nature or with a clearly defined task, by creating a network
of departmental agencies or semi-autonomous organisational adjuncts.
These QUAGS (quasi-governmental organisation) or QUANGOS (quasi non-
governmental organisations) as they are known to theorists of
public administration, are freer from day-to-day parliamentary
scrutiny and able to concentrate on a single task without being
distracted by the full range of concerns of the sponsoring depart-
ment.
But this creeping fringe of Whi tehall not only infuriates the growing
number of bureauphobic M.P.s who see it as a form of camouflage
of key policy initiatives offering at best only ex post facto account-
ability; it also raises problems of control and accountability
within the civil service itself as the organisational structure becomes
more fractured by ad hoc improvisation. The young man in my local
garage who in one day received separate and uncoordinated visits
from the Local Training Board, the Training Services Agency and the
Manpower Services Commission, each offering different training
opportunities without reference to each other, will have some sense
of the executive maze that presently characterises the interface
between education, training and employment. The combination of size,
complexity and specialisation, compounded by the requirement for fast
action in a more interventive mode, has increased the bureaucracy's
need for more control over the services it administers'and more freedom
from parliamentary or public restraint.'
So, while its parliamentary critics seek to emasculate or dismember
the central bureaucracY through such means as political!admininsrrative
devolution, select committees, and disclosure of executive advice,
all designed to render the bureaucracy more accountable both to parl-
iament and directly to the people, the planners within the administ-
rative machine have been concerned with developing internal innovations
designed to maintain its unity and cohesiveness under a growing workload.
8Attempts to reconcile these conflicting pressures have nourished
the practice in recent years of co-opting non-administrators on
to the management of essentially adminis.trative organisations, a
practice which goes some way to meeting demands for more parti-
cipative democracy and more involvement of specialist advice
without necessarily relinquishing executive control.
It is a complex picture, and the temptation to oversimplify it
even more than I have done is hard to resist. Accountability
in action will typically present us with the problems of whether
we are seeing an attempt to recognise and respond to legitimate
citizens rights and interests and to give them effective voice
or a strategy to legitimate the policy preferences of a power
elite. The issues are mirrored at the local level, and there-
fore the complexity is compounded by the interactive effects of
changes in the distribution of control between central and
local government.
It may be clear, for instance, that the Department of Education
seeks a more influential role in the determination of local
educational policy, but it is equally clear that what is envisaged
falls well short of the kind of take-over bid that the Manpower
Services Commission has initiated in the further education sector.
The 1976 Layfield Committee on Local Government Finance; concerned
with the lack of clear accountability for expenditure arising from
a confusion between central and local responsibility, considered
but rejected proposals to transfer financial control to national
government. In reaching this conclusion it was infltlenced by
representations from the DES to the effect that such a transfer
would give the central administr~tion too much power. Later in
this review we shall look more closely at recent developments in
cent",,:)Ilocal relations in education. For the moment we might just
note that when, in the context of Layfield, the Department was
offered the prospect of a mighty club with which to beat the edu-
cational system into line it insisted that all it wanted was a more
compelling baton. We would do well to bear this in mind when we
come to examine some of the ways in which the Department has
9responded in the past decade to mounting internal and external
pressures.
Educational accountability is embedded in this context, both
influencing and influenced by it. Is the current spread of
Taylor-style school board democracy, for example, a genuine advance
·in grassroots participation and public accountability, or would
it be more accurate to categorise it as the QUANGO outcrop of a
more sophisticated technology of administrative control? In
Lindblom's terms, are we moving towards an intellect-guided or
preference-guided educational institution? we could ask the same
question of the Great Debate, or of the structure of consultation
and decision-making employed by the Assessment of Performance Unit.
But again I leap beyond my argument. At this point it may be
useful to review the recent history of the education service
within the liberal business state, and ask "How did accountability
come to the fore-front of managerial concerns?"
The Rise and Fall of Educational Spending
In 1970, following twenty years of expansion under the doting sponsor-
ship of the welfare state, expenditure on education reached a high
water mark by overtaking expenditure on defence for the first time.
The same year, however, marked the end of the post-war growth era
in the social services generally, and of the priority hitherto
accorded to the education services in particular. The fiscal ice
age had begun, and a period of educational buoyancy backed by a
generous commitment of national resources gave way to a period in.
which the big spending services, among which education was second
only to health and social security, ground to a crawl as the hare
of public expenditure was harnessed to the tortoise of economic
growth.
Now it is widely assumed that the accountability movement in education
is a response to the financial climate of crises and cuts that has
characterised the seventies. An informal survey of the views of
senior LEA personnel, conducted as part of the research for this
10
review, backs this assumption. But I would contend that managerial
concern for accountability was an effect of educational expansion
and the growth of local government in the sixties, a consequence
of the need for more sophisticated thinking about increasingly
complex administrations. That a transformation of rationale for
accountability took place in the seventies is undeniable, and hardly
surprising in view of the pressures for cost-effectiveness and the
competition for scare resources that stringency generated. But
accountability as a concept was already prominent in the plans
and experiments of local as well as national government before the
Tr<:Bsury axe fell. Not to grasp this is to fail to understand why
some of those education officers most prominent in the prosyleti-
zation of accountability-based management at the beginning of this
decade have since joined the ranks of its most uncompromising
adversaries. In that time accountability changed from being a
means of informing uncontested investments and facilitating co-
operative planning with other services to an unsympathetic audit
of coveted expenditure.
We don't have to look very far to appreciate the substance of this
proposition. The pace, range and complexity of welfare legislation
in the sixties heaped responsibilities upon local government even
as it provided increased resources to meet them. The strain of
coping with a comprehensive range of linked services with an admin-
istrative structure geared to depar~ental autonomy, and the prospect
moreover, following the Redcliffe- Maud Commission, of having to do
so within even larger local government units, was bound to force some
re-thinking of the executive structure, ar:d this re-thinking was
evident long before the 1972 Act. By the late sixties firms of
management consultants were busy revamping County Hall administrations
with variations of the Planning, Progrqrnming and Budgeting System
that was simultaneously infiltrating Whitehall. Redcliffe-Maud be-
rated local government for its failure to evaluate policy alter-
natives while national government was already switching to output
budgetting and seeking to interlock central and local administrative
paradigms, so that by the beginning of the seventies the notion of
management by objectives, with its concomitant requirement to monitor
11
the results of resource allocation, was a focal concept in local
planning. With the 1972 Act looming up a study group on local
authority management structures was set up in 1971 under Bains'
chairmanship, which was to set out the now familiar concept of
corporate management. Although the Bains Report employed a rhetoric
of efficiency rather than accountability, it clearly conceived
greater accountability as a key to improved management. Thus
"In order to assist in the vital process of monitoring perform-
ance against defined objectives, greater attention must be paid
to the development of methods pf assessing the effectiveness of
activities. The main criterion of success has for too long been
the amount of resources put into a service, with but little regard
to output."
(Recommendation 7)
Bains reported in 1972, before the Treasury shoe really began to
pinch, .and almost two years before local government reorganisation
was implemented. Educational administrators did not wait for Bains,
however. Even as the Bains' study group deliberated, another in-
formal committee of DES and LEA administrators was developing a three
year dialogue about educational management, published by the Society
of Education Officers in 1974. The publication echoed and reinforced
the Bains' view, claiming "There is now a strong recognition of
the need to plan all services on a corporate basis" and endorsing
the Bains' emphasis on "defining objectives and producing methods
of analysing achievement and alternative policies". Again there
was little mention of accountability, indeed even a specific dis-
avowal of the use of assessment for other than resource allocation
decisions of a general nature. And the group stressed that the inter-
pretation of output measures "is·a skilled process which should be
done under the direction of professional educationists." Although
the mechanisms of accountability featured as an indispensable
element in the recommended management model, it is clear that the
concept as we now understand it did not.
Let us now add to these somewhat disparate strands of recent history
some others that may help us to appreciate the complexity and the
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contradictions of educational accountability. Up to this point
we have concentrated on the changing ideology of public administ.-
ration that resulted from bureaucratic expansion and was reflected
at the national level in the federalist reforms of the 1970 White
Paper, "The Reorganisation of Central Government" and at the local
level in the 1972 Bains I Report. At both levels of government there
was a growing conviction of the need for more integrated planning,
more positive management, more policy evaluation through the defini-
tion of targets and the monitoring of effects. This transformation
of administrative philosophy predated the accountability movement
but was well equipped to respond to those demands for account-
ability that were directed at the shop floor end of the delivery
system. In that sense it could be argued that the accountability
issue fell into the laps of those senior administrators intent upon
pushing through radical reform of the government machine. Account-
ability was to prove, however, a tricky resource with hazardous
potential for rebound. As we have already noted the problem for
managers was how to utilise the concept to raise the level of
responsiveness to central policy of personnel in the system with-
out fomenting public and parliamentary concern about mandarin
power. In education the problem called for judicious initiatives
and selective exploitation of the turbulent pool of dissatisfactions
that began to rock the boat of educational practice in the early
seventies. One way to gain some purchase on how the accountability
issue emerged and was structured is to review the curriculum reform
movement, and it is to this that we now briefly turn.
Curriculum Obsolescence and Models.of Planned Change
The last twenty five years have seen attempts, first in the USA but
also in Britain, Sweden, west Germany and latterly in most of the
advanced industrial nations, to organise and accelerate the process
of curriculum change. In this country the innovation moveme!1t that
flourished throughout the sixties grew from forecasts made in the
early fifties that economic growth would be checked by manpower
shortages in science and technology. Throughout the fifties, as
awareness of the need for some new machinery to galvanise the schools
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grew, observers of the established tri-partite power partnership
in the education service noted signs of increasing unrest within
the Ministry about central government's exclusion from the 'secret
garden of the curriculum', a phrase used by the Minister in 1960
to characterise teacher autonomy. One observer, Manzer, describes
the period leading up to the sixties as one in which the tradition
of partnership was increasingly seen by those in central govern~
ment as inadequate in the face of the problems created by an ex-
panding and changing education system. The manpower arguments used
by sociologists pressing for an end to selective secondary school
education supported the development in the Ministry of a view of
education as a form of economic investment. The Ministry began
to move from its traditional "regulatory control" function, to a
more positive role in policy making and the setting of national
goals.
In tertiary education the government, bent upon engineering the
delivery of more profitable human resources, found plenty of room
for manoeuvre in the non-university sector, and systematically
developed the binary system throughout the sixties, expanding and
upgrading the institutions of technical and vocational education
into a high-quality training arm of the drive for industrial re~
generation. Throughout this period the universities came under increasing
pressure to respond to national manpower needs, both through the
weakening of the buffer function of the UGC, and the stipulative
emphasis on immediate utility that in recent years has characterised
the conditions of support for academic research to an extent that
indicates a quite significant shift of control over the generation
of new knowledge.
But the secret garden of the school sector proved to be much JJlore
alertly guarded.
The assault was signalled in 1962 by the setting up in the Ministry
of a Curriculum Study Group to "oversee examinations and curriculum".
In view of all the warnings which preceded this initiative, it is
hardly surprising that the reaction of the partners was hostile.
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The u~shot of it all in 1964 was a new institution, the Schools
Council, removed from the Ministry, and reasserting in its con-
sti~ution the principles of tripartite control and teacher autonomy.
The Council immediately took over the sponsorship of innovation
initiated by the Nuffield Foundation and launched a comprehensive
range of national development projects to review and up-date'virt-
ually the, whole of the school curriculum, and to generate approp-
riate materials and guidance. At first it was, widely assumed that
the products would be snapped up by the schools; when it became
clear, in the late sixties, that the accomplishments of the develop-
ers were falling far short of the goal of transforming professional
practice the Council was subjected to increasing criticism, both
from those who saw it as a toothless tiger and those who saw in
its dominant teacher representation a powerhouse of teacher union
imperialism. By the early seventies the image and morale of the
Council, despite its strenuous efforts in product dissemination
and evaluation, and the lack of any clear evidence of its alleged
failure, were at a low ebb, and the situation once again ripe for
new initiatives and proposals.
New Initiatives" New Tides
Theorists of planned innovation, disillusioned with the first decade
of reform, were casting around for new models, looking for the
optimal combination of central punch and grass roots initiative.
The central ministry, still formally committed to the Council
as the main national agency of change but convinced of its inadequacy,
was gearing itself for a new independent thrust.
The first evidence of this new thrust emerged in 1972 in the shape
of the National Development Programme in Computer Assisted Learning,
a new organisational animal in which the emerging format of administ-
rative thinking was harnessed to a bold central initiative in the
field of curriculum development. This five year, two-and-a-half
million pound programme, was not farmed out to existing agencies
but placed directly under the control of an ad hoc organisation
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headed by an executive comInitte of bureaucrats from the seven
sponlloring 510vernment departments. With this kind of federalist
administrative control, aided by co-optated profesllional expertise,
and operating through a tough-minded stepped funding and matched
funding sylltem of sponsorship based on pre-specification of out-
comes, with a heavy investment in both internal and independent
evaluation, the Programme could be defined all an experimental proto-
type of a new instrument of educational change.
The creation of the Programme also marked the development of a
closer relationship (albeit bristle to bristle) between the Depart-
ment of Industry, which was influential in securing Treasury blessing
for the investment,and the Department of Education, which assumed the
pollition of primus inter pares in its management. The link between
educational development and economic growth wall thus explicitly embodied
in the Programme structure. At the time of writing, following a
government decision to invest massively in the silicon chip industry,
plans for a twelve million pound educational/training development
programme on NDPCAL lines are already under discussion in Whitehall.
In this we can see the emergence of a model of educational development
that is closer to the kind of control now exercised by the commandos
of the Manpower Service Commission in further education than it is to
the negotiated organisational structure of curriculum development that
dominated the sixties.
The next major thrust from the DES was the setting up, in 1974, of the
Allsessment of Performance Unit to monitor national standards among the
llchool population. Again logic might suggest the location of such an
agency within the Schools Council, which nad responsibility for exam-
inations within itll remit, but by this time the Council was so demoral-
ised that the Department was able to lodge the APU within Elizabeth
House without attracting organised resistance. Mind you, the new unit
did not at first appear to constitute a major thrust, and the teacher
unions were heavily represented in its supervisory structure. It was
set up with a staff of one secondedHMI, and a classics expert at that,
which might be interpreted as a defiartassertion of the 'generalist'
principle, or as an attempt to disguise the new gun-boat as a gonobla.
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I shall have more to say about the APU later in this review. For
the moment we should note how neatly the APU's consistent advocacy
of objectives-based teaching dovetails with the data requirements of
the new administrative paradigm.
But in 1974 the Department of Education was still professing, publicly
at least, staunch support for the Schools Council. Not until October
1976, did it declare its hand. Then, in a confidential (but leaked)
memorandum to the Prime Minister, the Department proposed that it
should have a greater say in deciding the curriculum of the schools.
Expressing strong criticism of the Council ("overall performance •••
generally mediocre ") the memorandum called for a review of its functions
and constitution, and enhanced powers for the Department's inspector-
ate to secure improvements in the curriculum. Advocating a national
core curriculum to raise standards of achievement and ensure adequate
attention to mathematics and science, the memorandum based its case
for tighter central control on the need for schools to serve more
effectively manpower requirements, particularly to produce techno-
logists and engineers for industrial expansion.
Both the timing and the content of this initiatve were well-jUdged.
It came in the aftermath of the William Tyndale saga, an event which
not only exposed and dramatically highlighted the laisser-faire tradi-
tion of control in education, but seriously undermined the image of
professional competence on which the case for teacher autonomy had
been based. With its appeal to standards, and its concession to
allegations of a decline in standards (although largely repudiated by
its own inspectoral surveys) the memorandum was judiciously responsive
to the rising tide of educational consumerism, in particular to middle-
class fright at the closing noose of classless institutional provision.
And With its emphasis on industrially relevant skills it provided
an opportunity for the Prime Minister to launCh a counter-offensive
against an Opposition campaign that, in the wake of the Chancellor's
£6,000 million public expenditure cuts earlier that year, had success-
fully marshalled various discontents into an effective political plat-
form. Small wonder that in its memorandum the Department vouchsafed
the view that"the climate for a declaration on these lines may now be
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favourable."
By this time,too, the Department was itself under severe attack, and
anxious to export the pressure. In 1975 the Paris-based OECD
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) published
an evaluation of th~ Department which alleged that government policy
Was controlled by career civil servants and formulated largely in
secrecy. The Report took the Department to task for insufficient
consultation in planning and advocated more open policy-making.
Following the OECD Report Parliament set up a committee to investi-
g~te policymaking within the DES, and this committee concluded
with a broad endorsement of the OECD critique. Parliamentary
Criticism of the Department mounted but was so contradictory in
,~tsFontent that it must have been difficult for the civil
servants to fashion a response. On the one hand they were criticised
for lack of consultation, on the other for their failure to respond
quickly and decisively to problems. In this latter respect they
were compared unfavourably with the mighty fledgling Manpower Services
Commission , yet it should have been clear that the speed of action
and "smash and grab" tactics exhibited by the MSCwere made possible
not just by a massive injection of funds but by its freedom from the
tangled, web of consultative processes in which the Department of Edu-
cation was firmly embedded.
The Department was flooded with recommendations from the Select Commit-
tee. For instance, in 1977 the Education Sub-Committee, enquiring
into allegations of lack of basic skills among school leavers, recom-
mended that headmasters should have limited tenure subject to inde-
pendent evaluation, that there should be ah enquiry into maths teach-
ing, that, the number of examining,boards be reduced, that teachers
of basic skills receive volunteer assistance. The political lunacy
of some Committee recommendations compounded the work-load of the
Department by providing red flags for the bullish militancy of the
now heavily unionised teaching profession and stiffening teacher
resistance to accountability initiatives. Criticism of the Depart-
ment also encouraged those educational academics like Maurice Kogan
who favoured Scandinavian paradigm of the relationship between'
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research and policy-making,and who were exploiting the slip stream
of the OECD Report. As if all this were not enough the Department
had to cope with a huge drain of potential resources into the
development of training, and growing pressures from Brussels for
accountability to and implementation of EEC policies frequently
at odds with national priorities and preferences. Being called
upon to become both more democratic and more decisive, the Depart-
ment responded in part by fashioning a change of role for the
traditionally secretive and largely advisory inspectorate, on the
one hand encouraging more publication of inspectorial evaluations,
on the other shaping them into a would-be technocratic force through
the vehicle of an expanding Assessment of Perfomance Unit. Further
evidence of muscular intent came in the shape of a survey of local
education authority curriculum policy which has yet to be processed,
a survey which contained clear warning (widely interpreted as bluff)
of the possibility of central intervention in any authorities deemed
to be lacking in educational management.
In delineating these developments in this way it is easy to lose
sight of the impact of demands for more direct accountability to
the citizenry. Yet the aspirations of administrators and politicians
for greater control over the service have to be set alongside the
aspirations of traditionally excluded groups for more information
and more participation in educational decision-making. The seventies
have seen tentative advances towards school-board democracy, a general
trend to widen the range of non-professional representation on both
consultative and decision-making committees and an opening up of
processes of local government policy-making that were previously
conducted in secrecy. In this respect Tyndale was a significant
catalyst; to those in complacent possession of power it constituted
an unprecedented threat to public apathy, galvanising single-issue
pressure groups into developing multiple-issue policy platforms, and
breathing new life into the languishing body of disaffected and dis-
enfranchised parents.
The immediate effect was to put those supposedly "in charge" on the
defensive, and in some cases to bring about long-fought-for concessions.
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The ILEA, for instance, made pupil records available to parents,
a change of policy hailed as a triumph py the Confederation for
the Advancement of state Education, a middle-class parent organi-
sation which had campaigned on this issue. Other pockets of dis-
sidence, widely varying in political complexion and educational
intent, also sensed the opportunity for influence and took advant-
age of the aftermath of Tyndale to exploit a suddenly widespread
acknowledgement of the concept of citizen's rights.
At the present time we can safely say that one consequence of these
pressures and the response of the education service to them is both
a conceptual and an operational confusion between the notion of
accountability as a condition of autonomy and the notion of power-
sharing as an expression of accountability. From the point of view
of the managers of the system the political context of accountability
is one which requires them to devise an efficient form of democracy,
a more demanding task than that which faced those control engineers
whose re-design of the technical processes of factory production
inspired the theorists of contemporary social administration. Parent
power, a cause repeatedly espoused by Conservative Party spokesmen
and embodied in various policy proposals ranging from voucher systems
to a "parents' charter" is now a fact of administrative life. As
I write, an action group of parents has chalked up another success
with an Appeal Court decision that Haringey Council was guilty of
an "actionable conspiracy" earlier this year in closing schools
during a caretakers' strike. The role of the courts in adjudi-
cating issues of accountability in education is still a modest one
in this country (unlike the USA) but both local and national govern-
ment have been discomfited by legal jUdgeme~ts during the seventies
to an extent that has both encouraged dissidence and made inevitable
new educational legislation to clarify power relationships.
At one level such action groups may be seen as further evidence of
the emergence of community power, already a countervailing force
to central planning in the field of transport and communications .•
The motorway and airport planners in the last few years have found
themselves embarrassingly engaged in pitched battles with villages
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as the nominal processes for public consultation become registries
of heated protest.
Accountability and Evaluation
Up to this point little has been said about evaluation, the means
by which accountability is rendered. Evaluation and accountability
are intimately intertwined both historically and conceptually, but
the permutations are many and varied. Since the focus of this review
is the accountability movement rather than the evaluation movement
I shall try to anchor the slippery relationship by adopting a personal
definition of evaluation and then relate this concept to differing
usages of accountability. For the purposes of this review evaluation
will be taken to mean the process of obtaining information about the
values and effects of educational activities. This definition may
prove to be particularly helpful in the context of accountability
because,unU9ua~ly,itgivesequal prominence to ends and means, and
we already know that advocates of accountability range from those
who seek more evidence that the educational sector accomplishes its,
stated goals to those who feel that the accountability requirement
is not satisfied unless more acceptable goals are effectively pur-
sued. Among the latter group are those who argue that changes in
the control of the education service constitute an essential pre-
condition of adequate accountability, whilst the former group includes
those who view such changes with alarm, arguing that greater account-
ability can only be justified if the acknowledged autonomy of pro-
fessional educational groups is at least respected and preferably
enhanced. In practice such a clear division of opinion is seldom
transparent, not least because accountability is typically only one
of many issues simultaneOUsly pursued by active individuals and organ-
isations concerned with education development. Some of those who
favour more control over the bureaucracy, for instance, want to pro-
tect the schools fro~bureaucratic interference, and some of those
engaged in stimulating the schools' capacity for self-evaluation
also favour community involvement in the process of curriculum develop-
ment. One LEA which employed the rhetoric of public accountability
to get its schools to yield up performance data then closed the
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meetings of its education committee to the public on the grounds
that it was handling more sensitive information.
:l'heroles of evaluation, and consequently of an evaluation pro-
fession, in all this, have not yet emerged in any clear form, although
we can safely assert that some kind of evaluation process is en-
visaged in any accountability plan, whether its focus be policy
or personnel, resource allocation or learning outcomes. But the
demand for accountability through systematic evaluation in this
country, in contrast to the USA, has to contend with an evaluation
community that is in the first place too small in numbers to meet
the need and too idiosyncratic in approach to slot as neatly into
managerial frameworks as did its much more developed and monolithic
counterpart in America. Evaluation in this country emerged in the
context of the curriculum development movement of the sixties and
developed a tradition (now loosely labelled 'illuminative') that
stood in marked contrast to the parent tradition of research which
donlinated the evolution of evaluation in most other countries. The
illunlinative approach was culturally appropriate, reflecting in its
concern to capture the complexities of educational process and in
its sensitivity to the consultative tradition of personnel relation-
ships both the values and the power structure of the English school
system. And when, in the seventies, this native evaluation school
felt compelled to confront the suddenly contentious issue of its own
political role the result was a widely shared concern about the
dangers of co-option by powerful sponsors, particularly bureaucratic
sponsors. In consequence even that small band of evaluators thrown
up by the curriculum innovations of the sixties proved to be mal-
adapted to the ideology underlying infOrmation needs in the seventies.
The National Programme in Computer Assisted Learning burned its fingers
on the process-oriented and politically awkward UNCAL evaluation team
(led by the reviewer, I should add) while the Schools Council later
had great difficulty in attracting to its Industry Project an exper-
ienced evaluator who was also politically 'acceptable'.
What this meant was that the evaluation needs generated under the
rubric of accountability in response to both internal and external
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pressures for more policy control and more evidence of effective-
ness had to be met from elsewhere - from the long established
testing service agencies such as the National Foundation of Educa··
tional Research, from the pool of existing achievement test instru-
ments, and by the conversion of existing personnel to carry out
evaluation roles. By the early seventies the NFER waS ailing,
victim of the long recession that followed the banishment of the
II-plus and the onslaught of the break-away evaluation community.
Within a few years it was flourishing once more under DES and
LEA sponsorship as the Assessment of Performance Unit led a
renaissance of measurement in schools.
Accountabili ty on the Ground
At some point, and I think it has been reached, we want to know what
difference all these accountability arguements, and the initiatives
stemming from them, are in fact making on the ground. Do they add up
to an accountability movement in education, and if so, what is its
emergent form in so far as we can discern it? The following summary
with its mixture of facts and impressions, is intended to indicate
both ideas in currency and issues in contention.
At the helm of the DES is the incumbent Permanent Secretary, a Treasury
man who has already made evident his determination to acquire more
systematic feedback of a quantitative kind from the school sector.
His argument is the need to support the Secretary of State's bid for
resources in the Cabinet with hard evidence of productivity. But, of
course, he can no more organise a delivery,service by writing lists
of learning objectives in Elizabeth House than he can prescribe LEA
expenditure by preparing Rate Support Grant estimates, The schools
dispose, The problem is how to weld a distributed decision-making
structure into organised pursuit of the kind of learning outputs listed
by the Department in the early seventies following the introduction
of the system of Programme Analysis and Review. Hence the Assessment
of Performance Unit, a data collection instrument with considerable
potential for shaping curriculum goals. Hence the LEA curriculum
policy review, with its patently prescriptive priorities. The
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underlying organisa1:ionai logic Elnvisages a fOl:lll of ora\les1:rat,j.on
in',whiCh oepartmentalpianners, :LEA strateg,j.sts, andte~a\ler tact-
icianscombineto produce an agreed set'of goodli with the APU"
providin9 tHe quality control and the productivity indie;es. Thi$
is not tne place for a technical critique of the 1WU'liI assUmptions,
but we might note in passing that thlil' assfilssment structurfil is '
tfilchnocratic in fom; <letElrministic in values, and ~repariousl~
dependent upon a costly and defect_riddentElchnology'of test c~n­
stJ;uction., POlitically theAPU could, like i.ts American eqlli4. '
valent, prove to be a damp squib, or it could be !?C)wdl!J;keg, in
whicllcal>e the DepartDlent's 'decision to concede so mua\lsPl;\C,l"
on tne lid"to 'Ntn' represelltatives could in retrospect look espEic-
ia+ly judicious.
Elsewhere in London,'therevamp'ed Scnoois CQune:l.l bas a muCh'mo:re
bUS,j.nesslike look aJjCi\lt it, with the new post of SecJ;e1;ilrybU<ifing "
a Chief Execut:l;ve style'of personal manageDlentto the first 'holdf/lr
of 'the' off.,j.ee" John Mann, a leading figure in the Local I\l.\thod.ties
'",',move 'to corporatism in the early seventies. Thenl!wChair~anof
the Cpuncil is thf/l Chellhire CEO John Tomlinson, less'pt' a coliUnitted
corporatist than Mann, but an influl'1ntial eduCl;\tiona+ presence !n
. '--. '~"
'the ManpciwerServi¢es ComD\iss!on, and a go-getter oli some reput'i!.
""The Council is still in cllrysalis, and it is therefpre too eilJ;1y to
even guess at its likely impilct, but it is safe to say that the pro-
gramme of work of the Council will be subject to tighter central
l1l<lnagement, with a n'i!W emph",sis On financial accountability, effi-
cient delivery and active selling of the frlli 1;s of the (:ounC:i,l.'s
efforts.
'Soml.\ch fOr ground movements in the centre of the educational "ser-
vice. Whilt is the iinpil,ct of;accountal:>ili ty at the local le'li-el,in
"the authorities and scbools up and down the country?
.j.,'"
At first sight tjte local account$ility scene 1$ so diverSe that
a.+mOst any descript;l.ve geneJ;alisation seems Ij.kely tomis+ead. 'The
devel.ollmentof accountability patterns in education aut1l~ritie$
has a'mode$t, slow and evolutionary chara<;te,r in some arl\las, wherl\l
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!;he 51Pllcep,:t;)J,a$ pe:l:cola1;l"d with such a lack of pace and pas;sipn '
,that,it,<;oulq scarcely be helC! to,constitutea,lfigni;icantforce
,forchallge in If'e consciousness .of the cOllstituenc;y.. Such arealf,
don't m~e pews but i~ is import":!"t not to lose,s,,ight 0; thel!l within
the C"l!IPalfS 0; an overview. It is the pace-setters which ~eep
sub-editors happy, ,cqnflict rather than COnsenlfUS that catchelf
the casual reader's eyfi' and shapes h~s profile of local aceolint-
ability. The :r;es;lgnation of ,the Avon Chief Education Officer
and the subseq\lElnt blacking of the vacancy by thelfociety of
, .co ". ".
CEO's, the~e,qision by one Authority, to publish school by sc:l1Ool
performance, ;In public examinations, the formal demand by ,members
ill another Authority to see pupil aSl'1essmElnt da!;awit1'\held by itif,
officers, thEl trail-blazing implementation of school board del!l9-
cracy in one place, of saturation testing ,in another - these action
highlights, together with th,e,goal-scoring featif,in Tameside,
Islington, and Hqringey, for example, may provide a good indell: of
the iSSUeS in accountability, but an inadequate measure of the
general pattern of largely consensual change which is steadily
transforming the organisation 'InC! government, of ,education ,in Elvel:}'
arEla of the country.
The cOntrast ,with education in the sixti,Els, say, rElvealsthEl SCOPEl
of ,the change, ~e ,relevance of accountability. as Significant con-
ce!?!; un,derfying its logic. Equcation officers are now, as arelllult
of the bureaucratic reformations o,f 1974"more accountaqle to .other
officers within ,the administrative, hierarchies of local, government,
and in gElneralthis means they spend less time actuallY operating
the educational service, more in pressing resource claims and just-
iiyingElxpenditure to their colleagues 'in other service departments.
The lOE/s of autonomy of the CEO f,rom this c:1).angEl 'lIOnEl, varies con-
.,'., . '''' : .."'.. .'"
sidl"rably,but certainly some discretionary. ,powers haVEl, ,):)een<;:on-
ceded, to the Chief Executive,or the Treasure;r', Olt to, the, corpor-
atilllt committees. The traditional departmental pyramid of control
an,Q.a9Cquntab,ility seems to be <;jivi,ng w!J.ytp a new, stU,l shapeless
struc,t\lre of, ,administration marked, ,by, i,dioSlyncltatic valti,ations which
" ,,' ':, ,. ..' , ' ;,.' ",:.,'" ,': :" '.. .
defygener,,:lis,,:tion. In one Authority ,a" headplaster was sarl?eted by
, ,a ChiefExeC;:l1,~,ive pVElr ~he heaq ,9,f the ,q;:O, an 'ldm!ttedlY rare put
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still bewildering instance of radical departure f~om respected
boundaries. Last year an advertisement for a CEO contained the
statement "education experience not essential", an atypically
pure instantiation of Bains' theory. In other cases the CEO no
longer signs letters of appointment to teachers or sends agenda
j?apers to Education Committee members. More common is the
requirement for all non-teaching education appointments to be
cleared outside the education department, and virtually universal
is a close monitoring of staffing establishments in education.
Because administrative practice varies so much from Authority to
Authority, it is difficult to summarise the overall impact.
Some educational administrators claim that they feel they are working in a
more collaborative and supportive bureaucratic framework, others
that the clumsy and dogmatic imposition of new management is leading
tQ unnecessary delays, poor use of their time, md an unqerval\ling
of the tradition of personalised leadership through intimate involve~
ment in the day-to~day problems of the schools.
So much for internal changes in administrative organisation, but
we should note that so far we have been talking about changes in
the degree to which one bureaucrat is accountable to another, about
changes in bureaucratic decision-mqking which in themselves do not
effect change in the relationship between bureaucrats and others.
Except that, and it is an important exception, it has become more
important for the education administrator to demonstrate the cost
effectiveness of educational investment, and to do so in terms which
rely much less on the kind of ambiguous, j.udgement~saturateddata
which is acceptable currency within his own professional domain.
When we look at the relationship between members and officers in
local education, again we immediately see evidencl' of the rapid growth
of accountability procl'dures, although the effectiveness of these
procedures is open to question. The general pattern of change in
the organisation of local government in the seventies is one in which
education committees have ll'ss autonomy within the council (The
Association of Education Committees folded in 1977) and arl' also
more answerable to the community at large. In turn thl' members, no
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doubt helped by the introduction of the attendance allowance
scheme, are much more involved in a range of decisions previously
delegated to officers - >allocation of pupils to schools, compil-
ation of maintenance and renovation programmes for schools and
colleges, appointment of teachers, pupil assessment and instit-
utional assessment plans, establishing criteria of teacher
efficiency and promotion. Again we have to be careful not to
make too much of this incursion into professional territory.
Members are part-time and some would argue that both the growth
and the organi~ational complexity of local government in recent
years have made it increasingly difficult for the members to con-
trol the officers. The evidence I have suggests that the effect-
iveness of> more participatory decision-making by elected members
depends very much on the degree to which members and officers
share values and aspirations.
The accountability of local government to the community is also
moving away from a narrow electoral base to provide more opport-
unities for participation and observation. The democratisation
of school mangement is one evidence of this shift, and most
Authorities have introduced, some cautiously and others boldly,
innovations pioneered in Sheffield, Humberside and the London
boroughs. The opening of committee meetings to press and public
is another trend that provides windows for the interested layman
to the decision-making processes of County Hall. Education inform-
ation services have been improved in many localities,and both
members and officers spend more of their time explaining and just-
ifying their policies to parents who have become aware that they
have the right to question how their children are allocated to
institutions and how they are taug~t and assessed. Whether we inter-
pret this developing pattern as pacificatory or emancipatory in
intent, the fact is that there is in local education a pervasive
mood of responsiveness to the notion of public accountability.
Local advisers may well hold the key to the issue of whether
and how the accountability movement impinges on the. work of the
school. The advisory service has no equivalent in other departments,
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but is widely considered by students of education to play a crucial
role in the promotion of curriculum innovation and creative change.
Traditionally they have operated as free agents of quality control,
men who at their best combine the roles of policemen, firemen,
and curriculum entrepreneur. And it is within this crucial link
service between central management and the schools that ortho-
dox accountability finds its most implacable adversaries. This
should surprise no-one. The job of the adviser has yet to be
adequately described, and is not readily susceptible to the kind
of output-per-unit-cost evaluation so favoured by corporate account-
ants. Being sceptical of efforts to devise performance criteria
for their own task within such a framework, advisers tend to see
centrally devised plans for teacher and school accountability as
similarly reductionist in conception as well as alienating in
effect. They are, characteristically, reluctant agents of manager-
ial pressure for more depersonalised indices of school product-
ivity. Not all of them of course share these misgivings; there
are many who welcome the opportunity to exercise a more direct
and arguably more effective influence on the development of
schools than charismatic informality can guarantee. The contrast
in attitudes to accountability between advisory teams in differ-
ent Authorities strikes me as more marked than between administ-
rators or elected members, and this is bound to be a factor in
local development of school accountability schemes. This contrast
in attitudes is currently disguised by the apparent similarity of
emerging accountability structures involving the advisory services.
A growing number of Authorities have re-named their advisers
'inspectors' to emphasise their formal evaluation role. Team inspect-
ions of individual schools have been stepped up, especially since
the HMI reduced its commitment to full inspections. Achievement
testing, either by sample or saturation, is now an important funct-
ion of local inspectorates, who are also increasingly involved
in team planning with administrators, writing reports for senior
officers, participating in industry/education liaison groups,
defending policy to school governors and parent associations, and
working with teachers to produce schemes of work. The notion of
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the adviser as an enthusiast doing his own thing (with, in most
cases, a modest sum of cash to invest at his discretion) is under
siege from accountability imperatives. Some advisory teams will
choose to act as buffers against tough-minded accountability,
softening the edges of the industrial metaphor as they negot-
iate the consent of the schools. How many, we must wait and see.
Already it is evident that in some Authorities school perform-
ance evaluation is being systematically exploited to point up
shortfalls in resource provision. Accountability is a two-
edged sword.
Because accountability has tended to unfold through a top-down
sequence of organisational initiatives the impact on schools
and teachers is at this stage particularly difficult to gauge.
Certainly most schools are aware of a transformation of circumstances and
expectations, of challenges to their autonomy and pressure to explain
and justify how they discharge their trust. They are aware,too,
that falling school populations support local treasury arguments
for lower levels of resources and teacher accountability. The
possibility of sanctions against incompetent teachers, given a
background of rising teacher unemployment, cannot be lightly
dismissed. In the secondary sector the need for sixth-form
rationalisation threatens institution-based decision-making,
while in the primary sector political and consumer priorities
converge in a unified press for a 'no frills' curriculum.
In terms of actual impact generalisations will certainly mislead,
and should be treated as highly speculative. My impression is
that the objectives model of curriculum, widely adopted for the
curriculum reform movement of the· sixties and subsequently taken
up by the education bureaucracies in Whitehall and County Hall,
has established a beach-head in the schools. At the very least
it can be said that the school curriculum has moved from the
implicit to the propositional. Some LEAs require schoo~to lodge
statements of aims and intents, others provide middle management
courses for school personnel that emphasise goal-setting and aims
achievement evaluation. With more output testing and more reporting
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to governing boards, more local school inspections which have to
make sense to lay committees, the process of institutional techno-
logisation is in some areas well under way. Many heads and teachers
won't recognise this portrayal, of course. Accountability at the
school level is in some areas no more than impotent noise. One
influence yet to be clearly articulated is the response of the
teacher professional associations. If, as is not unlikely, they
put their weight behind the development of professionally control-
led school-based accountability schemes along the lines of the
Cambridge Accountability Project, current trends and ideologies
could suffer a sharp reverse.
The Future of Accountability
So whither accountability in England? Within the larger societal
framework it is not easy to discern the pattern of resolution
of' contemporary conflicts and pressures that will shape the educat-
ional service of the 1980s. It is safe to predict that the kind
of economic growth that would sustain a level of social services
adequate to meet consumer demand will not be attained; that the
state will continue to try to manage the economy and to engineer
the human resource needs of industry whilst seeking more cost
effective means of delivering services, possibly by encouraging
the private sector to grow, particularly in health 'and education.
The bureaucracy will not be dismembered, in part because it will
mobilise to resist the knife, in part because the needs of the
state are not reducible to the needs of localities. But it may
become more dispersed in the form of secondary centres in response
to devolutionary pressureso Bureaucratisation and democratisation,
two potent trends in the present transitional period, will trade
off to create more representative and more cumbersome organisation
structures in both the production and the social services sectors.
This will to some extent' enfranchise new pressure groups who will
know how to use the opportunity rather than the citizenry at large,
although in any case effective power will be exercised within the
ad hoc task forces which the administration will continuously
generate to escape the constraints of participative machinery.
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There is nothing fanciful about such speculation; all these
things are happening now. Private education, like private
medicine, is growing despite the abolition of the direct grant
school, and receiving increasing support from the public purse
(one estimate put the figure at £50 million pounds for 1978).
Pressures for cost effectiveness alone will be sufficient to
guarantee this subsidy although some form of accountability
will be part of the deal; it seems that the campaign for equality
of opportunity, like the effort to reduce income differentials,
has run its course for the time being. Industrial decline has
egalitarianism by the Windpipe, legitimating inequality in the
name of efficiency. School board democracy is spreading, slowly
and cautiously, theoretically giving local communities a voice
in school policy but in practice likely to provide leverage for
sectional lay interests. The Schools Council survives but in
reconstituted form, more representative and more cumbersome than
before, despite its hard-nosed managerial rhetoric, and its pot-
entially numbing accountability mechanisms.
How will teachers, in the end, respond to accountability? When
the glittering promise of technology delivers structural unemploy-
ment and the burden of state welfare leads to a reduction of bene-
fits for the unemployed but an increase in their respectability?
How exactly is accountability to national needs to be reconciled
with accountability to the pupil in a context which calls for
selective transmission of the work ethic?
And what of moral and political education in a nation searching
for a new basis of government by consent? . How will teachers con-
strue their accountability to the.young citizen in a democracy
where the stresses of contemporary social conflict threaten the
fabric of civil liberties, eroding liberal tradition and liberal
aspiration alike? Earlier in this review I reminded the reader
of a string of recent events in public life that have under-
mined the confidence of people in the probity as well as the com-
petence of government. If, however, that selective profile of
fallibility in high places conveyed a Solzhenitsyn air of doom-laden
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prophecy, this was far from my intention or conviction. But it
takes neither an alarmist nor a political dissident to feel a
genuine sense of unease about the stability of widely shared
liberal values. Racism has attained all-party respectability
(virginity tests for black immigrants may scandalise but many
subtler forms offfhnic victimisation apparently lie within con-
sensual limits of tolerance). Leading policemen clamour for
greater powers of arrest and resist the introduction of account-
ability mechanisms. The punishment of criminal acts persist-
ently reflects class-based assumptions about differential culp-
ability. We are not even allowed to know how many telephones
are tapped each year. And this not to mention the normalisation
of abnormal police and military power in Ulster.
When we talk of an accountability movement it is worth remembering
that in some areas of our social life the context is one of a
loss and not merely a lack of accountability. At some point,
perhaps when teachers have absorbed the present onslaught on their
own obligations and devised a comfortable and justifiable response,
they will give some critical attention to a reappraisal of what
students are entitled to learn about moral and political account-
ability. At the present time the climate is far from propitious
for such an initiative; the education service lacks confidence
at all levels, preoccupied with minimising damaging concessions,
unable to shake off the taint of Tyndale's cultural deviance.
This will pass, hopefully in time for teachers to take a close
look at the APU's currently beached proposals for monitoring
personal and social education, and to scrutinise the assumptions
values and interests underlying contemporary demands for young
people to acquire 'bet·ter' attitudes to work and a keener sense
of social and political responsibility. What is, in 1979, the
cultural inheritance of the young?
We shall see. Nothing is quite so revealing of the distribution
of power and values in organisations than attempts to change them.
I believe that power over the English school is so effectively
distributed that it can only be effectively changed by consent,
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between legislature and executive, between teacher and pupil,
and between school and community. Each party can frustrate the
aspirations of the others, none can unilaterally and successfully
impose its will.
In accountability and its associated themes we can discern a
loosely coordinated coalition of efforts to persuade teachers to
modify their traditional rhetoric of service to the individual
child. The concept of the teacher as an executor of the public
will is certainly consistent with democratic theory but stands
in contrast to the 'academic freedom' that insulates his university
colleagues from political interference. A self-critical, openly
reflective and responsive teacher profession could argue the case
for extending such freedom to those whose task is to emancipate
the young through the cultivation of their critical and expressive
powers. we don't have such a profession now, but we have become
so accustomed to the law of opposite effects in educational in-
novation that it seems none too fanciful to foresee such an out-
come as the ultimate legacy of the accountability movement.
Barry MacDonald
Centre for Applied Research in Education
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